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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the HILDA survey, this paper analyses Australian gender wage gaps in both public 
and private sectors across the wage distribution. Quantile Regression (QR) techniques are 
used to control for various characteristics at different points of the wage distributions. 
Counterfactual decomposition analysis, adjusted for the QR framework, is utilised to 
examine if the gap is attributed to differences in gender characteristic, or differing returns 
between genders. The main finding is that a strong glass ceiling effect is detected only in 
the private sector. Secondly, the acceleration in the gender gap across the distribution 
does not vanish even after extensive controls. This suggests that the observed wage gap is 
a result of differences in returns to genders. By focussing only on the mean gender wage 
gap, substantial variations of the gap will be hidden.  
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1. Introduction 
The latest Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, Cat 6302.0) data suggest that on 
average, hourly earnings of full time males and females are $28.83 and $23.4 respectively. 
This is an earning ratio of 81 percent, which has narrowed by around 4 percentage points 
over the last decade. Furthermore, in Australia there are more women undertaking tertiary 
education compared to men. It is reported that 50.6 percent of professionals with 
bachelor’s degrees are women in 2003 (ABS, Cat 6227.0). Despite the remarkable 
changes of recent labour market structure, women held just 1.3 percent of the top 
management positions in the largest Australian companies1 (Wirth, 2001). According to 
the 2004 annual survey conducted by the Government’s Equal Opportunity for Women in 
the Workplace Agency, only two of the top 200 companies are chaired by women, and 
just four have women chief executives. 
The situation where gender pay gaps are typically wider at the top of the wage 
distribution is known as the ‘glass ceiling’. It is one of the most compelling metaphors 
recently used for analysing inequality between men and women in the workplace, to 
describe a barrier to further advancement once women have attained a certain level. They 
can see their male counterparts promoted while they are not. Whilst many wonder what it is 
that keeps women from reaching the top, the answer is likely to be complex and involve the 
interplay of several factors. 
In contrast, the ‘sticky floor’ can be viewed as the opposite scenario of the ‘glass 
ceiling’, when the gaps widen at the bottom of the wage distribution. Booth et al. (2003) 
defined it as a situation arising where otherwise identical men and women might be 
appointed to the same pay scale or rank, but the women are appointed at the bottom and 
men further up the scale.2
In Australia, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 was adopted to promote equality 
between men and women, as well as to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex and 
marital status in the labour force. However, there is a general consensus that the public 
sector is more isolated from rigorous market competition. Consequently, females are more 
                                                 
1 Some might argue this is a cohort effect. In 2001, the ABS reported a mean age of 40 years old for 
professionals. If the claim of cohort effect is true, males’ higher education participation rate should be much 
higher than females 20 years ago. However in 1980, female higher education participation rate of 9.2 percent 
is already higher than males of 7.8 percent (DEETYA, 1997).  Hence fewer female representatives in top 
management positions should not be attributed to the lag of time effect. 
2 Note that the focus of this analysis is to compare conditional and unconditional wage distribution of males 
and females, for promotional or rank issues of the working environment see Booth et al. (2003). 
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likely to be sheltered from possible discrimination. As an extension, the analysis will be 
stratified by public and private sectors.  
The prime purpose of this study is to investigate whether a glass ceiling exists, or if 
instead a sticky floor is more prevalent in the Australian labour market. If a glass ceiling 
does exist, does it differ across the public and private sector? To address this question, 
conditional quantile regression (QR) will be utilised to estimate the gender pay gap across 
the entire wage distribution. Averaging the wage gaps is informative, but cannot address 
the question of whether or not a glass ceiling exists. Secondly, how much of the gender pay 
gaps can be attributed to the differences in gender characteristics, and the differences to the 
returns to those characteristics? To answer this, a counterfactual decomposition analysis 
adjusted for QR framework will be introduced. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The gender pay gap has traditionally been a central focus of the empirical labour 
literature (see for example Blau and Kahn, 2004). A persistent average gender wage gap 
is widely observed and has been identified based on the past empirical results (for 
Australia see inter alia Chapman and Mulvey, 1986; Wooden, 1998; Langford, 1995; 
Chang and Miller, 1996; Preston, 2000). Depending on which types of workers are 
compared and what is included in the control variables, the wage gap ranges between 10 
to 35 percent. 
Many researchers have attempted to investigate the gender pay gaps based on the 
average wage. This methodology focuses on the conditional mean, which might lead to 
the conclusion that the size of the wage gap and its possible causes are constant along the 
whole wage distribution. Little attention has been paid to either the glass ceiling effect, or 
to the unequal size of gaps experienced by the female high and low income earners, even 
though interesting insights might be gained by looking at the differences between 
different points in the wage distribution (some exceptions are mentioned below). An 
exclusive focus on the average may provide misleading insights into the gender pay gap. 
Is the female high-income earner more likely to be discriminated against? Does a glass 
ceiling exist? Are the factors that contribute to the existence of the gap the same for 
female low-income earners as they are for high-income earners?  
By measuring the mean of the pay gap, OLS is unable to provide any answers; 
hence, in attempting to answer these questions, the methodology of quantile regression is 
preferred. The focus is the different size of the gap at different points of the conditional 
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wages distributions. This study attempts to examine what factors are associated with 
greater wage dispersion, as well as how these factors vary across different levels of 
income for female Australian workers.  
The quantile regression technique was proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). 
Earlier Kuhn (1987) pointed out that conventional mean regression has its limitations in 
measuring discrimination. He showed empirically that U.S. women at higher wage levels 
are more likely to report being discriminated against.  
Buchinsky (1994, 1996, and 1998) further advanced the application of quantile 
regression in the U.S. labour market in the context of wage estimation and the return to 
education. He examined the gender wage gap at different points of the conditional wage 
distributions. In order to address female sample selection bias problem, he approximates 
the inverse Mill’s ratio from a nonparametric single-index selection model, into a power 
series expansions. The results show that in the U.S., wage inequality decreased for the 
high-school graduates and increased for the younger college graduates. Furthermore, 
highly qualified women have experienced a significant improvement in terms of wages, 
regardless of their position in the wage distribution.  
Usage of the quantile regression method can be said to have been popularised by 
Buchinsky (1998). Following Buchinsky, a small but growing literature has adopted this 
methodology. García et al (2001) investigated the Spanish labour market and concluded 
that the size of the absolute gender wage gap increases over the wage distribution. 
Albrecht et al (2003) showed that a strong glass ceiling effect exists in the Swedish 
labour market. Machado and Mata (2001) found that Portuguese gender wage gap is 
wider for high paid jobs and the biggest earning differential is located in the middle of 
the distribution. Dolado et al (2004) analysed Spanish labour market and concluded that 
highly educated females encountered a glass ceiling but the group with primary and 
secondary education encountered a sticky floor. Arulampalam et al (2004) investigated 
gender pay gaps by sectors of ten European countries and concluded that the observed 
glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky floors in most countries. 
This study seeks to investigate the extent to which gender affects the location and 
shape of the conditional wage distribution, and how these patterns differ across public 
and private sectors. To begin, the unconditional raw gap is estimated. It can be seen as a 
preliminary indicator of glass ceiling or sticky floor. However, the unconditional raw gap 
does not provide sufficient evidence to indicate whether or not glass ceiling or sticky 
floor exists. In addition, the next step is to estimate the conditional wage gap. Controls of 
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interest in the current analysis include demographic, education, geographic, employer, 
occupation and industry variables. Once various controls are formed, if gender pay gaps 
are still observed across the entire conditional wage distributions, this gap may be caused 
by some unobserved heterogeneity that the models cannot capture. Numerous studies 
have suggested that this may reflex sex discrimination that females face at work.3 In this 
study, discrimination is defined as the differences in return to the same characteristics 
between men and women. It is important to emphasis that any remaining gap after 
extensive control could be a form of discrimination, moreover, it could also be something 
else. A more detailed discussion will be presented in the later part of this analysis. 
 
3. Methodology 
To my knowledge, there is no published literature of gender wage gap in the 
Australian labour market focussing on other points of the wage distributions. The current 
analysis follows an approach similar to that of Albrecht et al (2003), in order to 
investigate how the gender gap evolves throughout the wage distribution, and to test 
whether wage discrimination is greater for female high income earners or among low 
income earners. As an extension, the analysis will be stratified by sectors, to examine if 
the wage gap differs across private and public sectors. 
 
3.1 Data Description: Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey 
Wave 1 of Hilda will be used for the analysis. HILDA is the first nationally based 
random panel dataset of Australian households. The initial wave of the survey was 
collected in the second half of 2001, and comprised 12,252 households selected from 488 
different neighbourhood regions across Australia. The household response rate from the 
survey was 66 percent. It contains a wide range of information, including information on 
labour status, hours of work, earnings, fertility and relationship histories, actual labour 
market experience and detailed information on children. The broad diversity of variables 
constitutes an important part of the current analysis. It enables the examination of glass 
ceiling phenomenon, by allowing the researcher to control for observable heterogeneity 
in the analysis. 
                                                 
3  For example see Albrecht et al. (2003), Kuhn (1987), Wooden (1999). 
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This dataset contains a total of 5,867 observations. Public sector sub-sample 
comprises 655 males and 913 females; while in the private sector there are 2,191 males 
and 1,726 females. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage, which is derived by 
using the respondent’s main job, at 2001 prices. Appendix A contains a detailed 
descriptions of the variables used in the regressions. 
 
3.2 Quantile Regression (QR) 
The quantile regression model, first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), 
can be viewed as a location model. The description is based on Buchinsky (1998). Let 
( , =1, 2, …, n; be the sample of a population, where is the dependent variable 
of interest,  is a  vector of regressors, for the 
ii xy , ) i iy
ix 1×k θ th quantile of conditional on the 
regressor vector . The relation is given by 
iy
ix
iii uxy θθβ += '   with      θθ β')|( iii xxyQuant = , 
where  is an unknown independent and identical distributed (i.i.d) error term. In the 
classical linear regression model, the normal distribution of the unknown error is 
specified. In this case however, the error term for the
iuθ
iuθ θ th quantile is left unspecified 
and is only required to satisfy the constraint of 
0)|( =ii xuQuant θθ , 
with no other distributional assumptions being made. The estimator for θβ  of the θ th 
quantile regression, is obtained by solving 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+−= ∑ ∑
> <βθ βθ
θθβθ
βθβθβ
θ ': ':
|'|)1(|'|minargˆ
xiyii xiyii
iii xyxy , 
where 0< θ< 1. θβ  that minimises the sum of the weighted residuals is chosen to obtain 
the estimator for the θ th quantile. For a negative residual, the weight is (1-θ); for a 
positive residual the weight is θ. Hence one of the advantages of QR is that, it allows one 
to estimate the marginal effect of a covariate on log wage at various points in the 
distribution, instead of just at the mean. In other words, by using QR technique, it is 
possible to estimate the effect of gender, education, occupations, industry and all other 
controls on log wage at the top (e.g. the 90th percentile), the median and the bottom (e.g. 
the 10th percentile) of the wage distribution. As for the coefficient θβ , it can be 
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interpreted as the estimated returns to individual characteristics at the θ th quantile of the 
log wage distribution. 
 
3.3 Counterfactual Wage Decomposition 
Estimation by quantile regression provides us with an indication of whether or not 
the returns to observable characteristics differ by gender, and how these differences 
change as we move across the wage distributions. In addition, we also want to know how 
important is the unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the gender wage gap. 
Hence the following step will be to construct an Oaxaca-Blinder type wage 
decomposition method adjusted for QR regression as in Machado and Mata (2000). 
However, rather than identifying the sources of the differences between the means of two 
distributions, quantile regression technique decomposes the differences between the male 
and female log wage distributions into a component that is due to differences in labour 
market characteristics between the genders, and a component that is due to differences in 
the rewards that the two genders receive for their labour market characteristics by various 
quantiles. 
Denote women’s and men’s returns by and , and their characteristics by 
 and  respectively. The idea is to generate a counterfactual density, in particular, 
the female log wage density that would arise if women were given men’s  labour market 
characteristics but continued to be ‘paid like women’.
fβ mβ
fx mx
4  Hence in the situation where 
identical men and women possess same productive characteristics ( ), men’s 
wages would be equal to the women’s wages, and no pay gap will be observed. Therefore, 
observed wage differences can be attributed to unequal treatment by gender, or other 
unobserved heterogeneity that the model fails to capture. A positive (negative) sign 
implies that market returns to men’s characteristics are higher (lower) than the returns to 
women’s characteristics.  
mf ββ =
This study follows Albrecht et al.’s (2003) application of Machado and Mata’s 
(2000) bootstrap method to implement the decomposition directly at each quantile. This 
involves estimating marginal density of wages that are consistent with the estimated 
conditional densities. These procedures are summarised as follows: 
1. Using a standard uniform distribution, sample the  quantile of interest.  thθ
                                                 
4  Alternatively, one can also generate the density that would arise if women retained their own labour market 
characteristics but were ‘paid like men’. 
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2. For men, at each percentile (1st to 99th), estimate a QR to predict men’s wages 
which rewarded from their retained characteristics. In other words, this is an 
estimate form by using  and . mθβ mx
3. For women, take a draw from men’s data, and construct a predicted wage by 
multiplying the chosen  by the estimate of .mx fθβ 5 This will be used to simulate 
the counterfactual distribution, namely what women would earn if they had men’s 
characteristics but were ‘paid like women’.6
4. Set the number of random draw m=5000. Use the men’s predicted wage data from 
step (1), load the appropriate data set and randomly sample (with replacement) a 
number of individuals equal to the number of times that percentiles was selected.7 
Prediction obtained from this step is the simulated men’s wage distribution. 
5. Repeat step (4) for women using data sets from step (2) to simulate the 
counterfactual distribution. 
6. To generate gender wage gaps, take the difference of each distribution from step 
(4) and (5) at various quantiles.  
This whole procedure is then replicated by n=200 times in order to obtain standard 
deviations of the gender wage gaps over the n iterations.8
 
4. Results 
In this section, sets of result estimated by different approaches will be presented. 
The observations included are full time and part time employees in the labour force, 
between the age of 18-60 years old, and who are not in employed agricultural sector. The 
                                                 
5 The calculated marginal distribution of wages of men and the counterfactual marginal distribution for 
women are consistent with the estimated conditional distributions. 
6 To generate the density that would arise if women retained their own labour market characteristics but were 
paid like men, simply reverse the role of male and female in step (2) and (3). The results of this alternative 
decomposition are not presented as the qualitative findings about the unexplained gaps remains the same. 
7  In other words, if the 35th percentile was selected 50 times, randomly draw 50 men from the 35th percentile 
data set. 
8  So far this analysis has not considered the endogenous sample selection problem. Buchinsky (1998) 
demonstrated that QR is not immune from selectivity problem either. For the purpose of this study, a 
multinomial logit selection model is estimated, since individuals not only choose whether or not they want 
to participate in labour force, as well as which sectors to participate in. The obtained inverse Mill’s ratios 
are insignificant in OLS regression of both sectors. In terms of QR, by truncated the inverse Mill’s ratio at 
the third term, it is found that the corrected and uncorrected wage gap is remarkably similar in both private 
and public sector. Hence obtained results are not presented but will be available from the author upon 
request. 
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dependent variable is the log of the average hourly wage in respondent’s main job. The 
results will be stratified by public and private sector.9
 
4.1 Raw Gender Wage Gap 
 
Figure 1: Raw gender wage gaps
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The raw gender wage gap is presented in Figure 1. In the private sector, the raw 
gap exhibits a monotonic upward trend as we move towards the upper tail of the wage 
distributions, although declining at lower tail. The acceleration is also detected in the 
public sector, however it only starts around the 90th percentile. In contrast, the wage gap 
is found to be wider at the bottom end. This is especially obvious in the public sector.  
The tendency of upward acceleration can be seen as an indicator of glass ceiling; 
whereas the wider bottom end can be seen an indicator of sticky floor. Note that in the 
private sector, the glass ceiling phenomenon seems to dominate; whereas in the public 
sector, the sticky floor phenomenon seems to be more noticeable. 
However these are only the unconditional wage gaps. In the next section, 
estimations using the quantile regression will be presented to see how much of the 
                                                 
9 To test if the estimation should be stratified by sectors, a Wald test is conducted by interacting all the 
explanatory variables with the private sector dummy. The result of F=3.72 is statistically significant at 5 
percent level, and the conclusion is that stratification by sector is appropriate.  
 8
observed raw gender wage gap can be attributed to differences in the returns to those 
characteristics. 
 
4.2 Pooled Quantile Regressions with Gender Dummy 
To investigate the effects of differences in characteristics on the gender gap at 
different points of the wage distribution, a series of quantile regressions on the pooled 
data set with gender dummy is constructed. Pooled quantile regression imposes the 
restriction that returns to the included labour market characteristics are the same for 
males and females. In other words, the variable of interest, the gender dummy, indicates 
the extent to which gender gap remains unexplained at different quantiles after 
controlling for individual differences and characteristics. 
To test if differences between various quantiles are statistically significant, joint 
interquantile tests are conducted at the 5 percent level. Significant statistical differences 
were found between the 10th and the 25th, the 25th and the 50th, as well as all other 
adjacent quantiles.10 The hypothesis of equality is overwhelmingly rejected in all cases. 
This finding justifies the usage of quantile regression, leading to the conclusion that the 
quantile regression method has value over and above the OLS, and that the mean results 
obtained by the OLS might be misleading. 
Table 2 presents the estimated gender dummy coefficients at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 
75th and 90th percentiles in the pooled quantile regression. As a comparison, the OLS 
gender dummy coefficient is also presented. Panels in Table 2 are a result of stepwise 
regressions due to the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables especially of 
occupation and industry dummies. A list of all controls for each stepwise regression is 
found in the Appendix A. 
From panels 2-4 in Table 2, in the private sector, a large reduction of the gap is 
found at the top of the wage distribution. Controlling for covariates does not account for 
much of the gaps at lower income levels. This implies that gender characteristics 
differences explain a large part of the glass ceiling effect, in other words males get more 
pay than their females counterpart because they are more experienced or more educated. 
The existence of the private sector wage gap cannot be attributed to the differences in 
return to those characteristics. On the other hand in the public sector, this reduction is 
found at the bottom instead of the top of the wage distribution after we put in additional 
                                                 
10  Test statistics see Table 5 in Appendix A. 
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controls. In other words, individuals’ characteristics account for a large proportion of the 
gap for lower income earners and the sticky floor effect has faded. The widest distance is 
still found at the top of the wage distribution, indicating that the public sector also has a 
glass ceiling. 
 
Table 2: Pooled Quantile Regression by sectors 
 
Pooled Private 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Raw gap 0.153*** 0.000 0.068*** 0.137*** 0.223*** 0.269*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.032) 
Basic and educational variables 0.121*** 0.008 0.061*** 0.115*** 0.176*** 0.204*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028) 
Basic, education and 
geographic variables 0.124*** 0.013 0.057*** 0.115*** 0.180*** 0.226*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.031) 
Basic, education, geographic 0.115*** 0.013 0.055*** 0.105*** 0.157*** 0.199*** 
and employer variables (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) 
Basic, education, geographic, 0.129*** 0.058** 0.081*** 0.101*** 0.180*** 0.190*** 
employer, occupations & 
industries variables 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.026) 
Pooled public 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Raw gap 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.164*** 0.141*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 
 (0.020) (0.042) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) 
Basic and educational variables 0.138*** 0.103** 0.085*** 0.140*** 0.144*** 0.169*** 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.029) 
Basic, education and 
geographic variables 0.134*** 0.118*** 0.099*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.140*** 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) 
Basic, education, geographic 0.122*** 0.089** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.144*** 
and employer variables (0.020) (0.038) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) 
Basic, education, geographic, 0.109*** 0.065* 0.093*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.159*** 
employer, occupations & 
industries variables 
(0.021) (0.039) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) 
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. 
Notes: a OLS indicates ordinary least square. b Reported figures are the estimated coefficients following by 
its standard errors. c Statistics were computed using 1,000 bootstrap samples to obtain appropriate standard 
errors. d * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level. e Refer to Data 
Appendix for the list of all variables. f For private sector, n=3917; public sector, n=1568 
 
Throughout this section, we assume that the returns to labour market 
characteristics are the same for men and women. To test if pooling estimation is 
appropriate, a Wald test is conducted by interacting all explanatory variables with the 
gender dummy. The results is statistically different at the 5 percent level, hence the 
estimation should be stratified by gender. However, the pooling results are still presented 
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in this section for the ease of interpretation, and simplicity of understanding. In the 
following section, results from stratification by gender will be presented. 
 
4.3 Quantile Regression by Gender 
QR by gender relaxes the assumption of equal returns to males and females. 
Results are reported in Table 3. To save space, included controls are basic and education 
variables,11 as they are often of primary interest. The results shows the extent to which 
returns to basic control variables differ between men and women at the various points in 
their respective distributions. 
In the private sector, age variables constantly have larger effect for females than 
males. Interestingly in the public sector, age coefficients are larger for males than females 
except for the top part of the wage distribution. If we use age variables as a proxy for 
experience, this implies that women will tend to be more disadvantaged in the private 
sector than the public sector, if women’s labour force participation is interrupted by 
family commitments.12 Note also women’s earning and age relationship tend to be flatter 
compared to men’s in both sectors, which means the effect of diminishing return comes 
in earlier for women than men. 
A male bachelor degree holder enjoys a higher return than a female in the public 
sector. This situation no longer holds in private sector. Higher education variables are 
found to have larger effect for high income females. This means that in the private sector, 
higher qualification is an important factor in explaining levels of income. Note that for 
both sectors, females obtain higher returns from lower qualifications in general. Another 
interesting finding is that coefficients of education variables are usually larger in the 
private sector than the public sector. This suggests that educational qualifications are 
rewarded more in the private sector. 
                                                 
11  For list of basic and education variables, see Appendix A. 
12  A more appropriate proxy for experience is a persons’ tenure (and its’ squared term), which are also 
included as the additional controls later on. 
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Table 3: Quantile regressions stratified by gender 
Private 
 Women        n=1,726 Men        n=2,191 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
age 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
postgrad 0.328*** 0.004 0.305 0.314** 0.396** 0.561** 0.330*** 0.235 0.347** 0.521*** 0.456*** 0.320*** 
 (0.104) (0.239) (0.222) (0.137) (0.158) (0.274) (0.071) (0.330) (0.142) (0.094) (0.097) (0.107) 
bachelor 0.215*** 0.146** 0.139*** 0.221*** 0.386*** 0.382*** 0.295*** 0.180*** 0.270*** 0.323*** 0.377*** 0.367** 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.042) (0.044) (0.052) (0.063) (0.037) (0.050) (0.045) (0.040) (0.057) (0.071) 
diploma 0.152*** 0.133** 0.084** 0.131*** 0.173*** 0.316*** 0.170*** 0.070 0.145*** 0.198*** 0.267*** 0.224*** 
 (0.035) (0.056) (0.038) (0.034) (0.062) (0.074) (0.040) (0.064) (0.047) (0.045) (0.068) (0.088) 
cert -0.024 0.046 0.004 0.010 -0.032 -0.025 -0.059* -0.029 0.003 -0.026 -0.061 -0.163*** 
 (0.029) (0.047) (0.029) (0.025) (0.031) (0.052) (0.030) (0.047) (0.031) (0.030) (0.040) (0.056) 
yr11_less -0.112*** -0.060 -0.083*** -0.071** -0.114*** -0.095* -0.156*** -0.082 -0.081** -0.133*** -0.203*** -0.272*** 
 (0.030) (0.056) (0.028) (0.024) (0.032) (0.055) (0.033) (0.050) (0.032) (0.031) (0.043) (0.055) 
miss_edu -0.015 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.055 0.029 -0.105 -0.054 0.032 -0.010 -0.146* -0.206 
 (0.055) (0.123) (0.053) (0.044) (0.077) (0.127) (0.077) (0.282) (0.109) (0.072) (0.086) (0.276) 
kids0_4 0.012 -0.054 -0.019 0.041* 0.041 0.052 0.059** 0.071* 0.061** 0.016 0.035 0.064 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.038) (0.024) (0.037) (0.065) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.054) 
kids5_14 -0.021 -0.111 -0.089** -0.028 0.020 0.112 0.044 -0.064 -0.003 0.097*** 0.097* 0.107* 
 (0.038) (0.089) (0.039) (0.033) (0.064) (0.108) (0.036) (0.064) (0.057) (0.036) (0.055) (0.055) 
married 0.063*** 0.075** 0.045* 0.033* 0.053* 0.009 0.071*** 0.080* 0.061** 0.080*** 0.050 0.039 
 (0.022) (0.037) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.046) (0.024) (0.042) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.048) 
parttime -0.029 -0.110*** -0.045** -0.024 -0.003 0.071* -0.109*** -0.264*** -0.162*** -0.106*** -0.075* 0.008 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.039) (0.029) (0.062) (0.037) (0.033) (0.044) (0.059) 
_cons 1.692*** 1.222*** 1.481*** 1.844*** 1.987*** 1.903*** 1.80***3 1.276*** 1.581*** 1.928 2.089*** 2.130*** 
 (0.107) (0.168) (0.110) (0.122) (0.130) (0.188) (0.108) (0.234) (0.128) (0.132) (0.156) (0.227) 
Public 
 Women        n=913 Men      n=655 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
age 0.037*** 0.028 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.037** 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.042** 0.023 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.019) 
age2 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
postgrad 0.315*** 0.295* 0.353*** 0.336*** 0.275*** 0.327*** 0.267*** 0.130 0.241*** 0.264*** 0.238*** 0.358*** 
 (0.069) (0.171) (0.081) (0.077) (0.079) (0.0910) (0.067) (0.188) (0.092) (0.067) (0.081) (0.092) 
bachelor 0.244*** 0.304** 0.260*** 0.270*** 0.136** 0.140*** 0.182*** 0.127 0.152** 0.181*** 0.145** 0.221*** 
 (0.054) (0.113) (0.069) (0.058) (0.069) (0.054) (0.057) (0.102) (0.071) (0.063) (0.057) (0.052) 
diploma 0.194*** 0.211* 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.135** 0.114** 0.142*** 0.095 0.109 0.105** 0.090* 0.096 
 (0.054) (0.111) (0.070) (0.055) (0.068) (0.050) (0.0550 (0.096) (0.068) (0.047) (0.051) (0.059) 
cert -0.069 -0.040 -0.067 -0.041 -0.132** -0.116* -0.069 -0.107 -0.113 -0.082 -0.095* -0.021 
 (0.057) (0.128) (0.066) (0.061) (0.072) (0.062) (0.055) (0.095) (0.071) (0.050) (0.053) (0.058) 
yr11_less -0.135** -0.023 -0.067 -0.108* -0.209* -0.175** -0.135** -0.174 -0.189** -0.148* -0.155** -0.073 
 (0.061) (0.124) (0.067) (0.059) (0.078) (0.070) (0.064) (0.111) (0.084) (0.075) (0.060) (0.086) 
miss_edu 0.155** 0.146 0.147 0.109 0.064 0.240* -0.052 -0.271 0.003 -0.181 -0.069 0.039 
 (0.073) (0.129) (0.092) (0.071) (0.119) (0.128) (0.150) (0.300) (0.282) (0.190) (0.190) (0.183) 
kids0_4 0.045 0.124* 0.051 0.035 0.027 -0.032 -0.033 0.170*** 0.058 -0.030 -0.060 -0.124** 
 (0.041) (0.072) (0.058) (0.040) (0.057) (0.055) (0.040) (0.060) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036) (0.047) 
kids5_14 -0.043 -0.028 -0.109* -0.022 -0.051 -0.105 -0.012 0.133* 0.025 -0.014 0.022 -0.057 
 (0.047) (0.087) (0.064) (0.059) (0.042) (0.062) (0.048) (0.073) (0.056) (0.044) (0.050) (0.043) 
married 0.049* 0.065 0.052* 0.034 0.027 0.020 0.039 -0.033 0.041 0.053 0.060* 0.121** 
 (0.027) (0.061) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.036) (0.031) (0.047) 
parttime -0.020 -0.141** -0.053 -0.058* 0.019 0.128*** -0.178 -0.411* -0.232*** -0.129* -0.009 -0.033 
 (0.027) (0.070) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039) (0.224) (0.214) (0.069) (0.077) (0.053) (0.070) 
_cons 1.986*** 1.626*** 1.788*** 2.056*** 2.174*** 2.440*** 1.816*** 1.107*** 1.484*** 2.090*** 2.607*** 2.667*** 
 (0.188) (0.372) (0.280) (0.168) (0.229) (0.296) (0.033) (0.314) (0.439) (0.349) (0.298) (0.388) 
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. 
Note: a OLS indicates ordinary least square. b Reported figures are the estimated coefficients following by its standard errors. c 
Statistics were computed using 1,000 bootstrap samples to obtain appropriate standard errors.  d * statistically significant at 
the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level. e Refer to Data Appendix for the list of all variables. 
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In terms of demographic variables, in general marital status and children variables 
have larger effect for women in both sectors, however they are always insignificant. The 
magnitude of part time status dummy is more often larger for males, implying that male 
part time workers are more likely to earn less compared to females. A possible explanation 
is that female part time workers are more common and more acceptable in the society, 
whereas males are always expected to work full time. 
Presented results from Table 3 indicate that the returns to labour market 
characteristics are different for men and women. The assumption of equal returns to males 
and females in the previous section could be misleading. In the following section, the 
results obtained from decomposition method will be presented. Decomposing gender wage 
gap by quantiles allow us to examine if the existence of the gap is attributed to the 
differences in gender characteristics, or differences in the returns to those characteristics. 
 
4.4 Decompositions 
Results from the counterfactual decompositions are presented in Table 4. The 
estimated OLS and unconditional raw gender gap are also listed for comparison. As in 
Figure 2 and 4, estimated gender wage gap are presented for each quantile of the log wage 
distribution along the 95 percent confidence intervals in both sectors. 
The first striking finding from Table 4 is that, estimated pay gaps across the entire 
wage distributions are positive, even after we put in additional control variables. Also 
almost all the estimates are all significantly different from zero at 5 percent level. As 
outlined in the previous section, a positive gap implies that market returns to men are 
higher than women’s. In other words, holding gender characteristics differences constant, 
men and women receive different returns to their identical characteristics. This is similar to 
the findings of Arulampalam et al (2004) for European countries.  
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Table 4: Estimated Wage Gap 
Private 
OLS Percentile Raw Decomposition Decomp with  occ & ind 
10th 0.000 0.008    0.065*** 
 (0.018) (.014) (0.014) 
25th    0.068***    0.060***    0.120*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) 
50th    0.137***    0.128***    0.177*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) 
75th    0.223***    0.202***    0.229*** 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) 
90th    0.269***    0.262***    0.258*** 
0.153*** 
(0.015) 
 (0.032) (0.018) (0.018) 
Public 
OLS Percentile Raw Decomposition Decomp with occ & ind 
10th    0.149***    0.110***  0.109*** 
 (0.042) (0.013) (0.015) 
25th    0.164***    0.123** 0.114*** 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) 
50th    0.141***    0.133***  0.124*** 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.008) 
75th    0.121***    0.136***  0.138*** 
 (0.027) (0.007) (0.007) 
90th    0.120***    0.158***  0.157*** 
0.152*** 
(0.020) 
 (0.027) (0.010) (0.010) 
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. 
Note: a OLS indicates ordinary least square; Raw indicates unconditional raw gender gap; Decomposition indicates 
estimated wage gap by counterfactual decomposition method; and Decomp with occ & ind indicates decomposition with 
occupation and industry dummies. b Reported figures are the estimated wage gap following by its standard errors. c * 
statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level.d Controls for Decomposition are age, age 
squared, postgrad, diploma, bachelor, cert, yr11_less, miss_edu, kids0_4, kids5_14, bornoz, married, defacto, divorced, 
contract, casual and parttime. e Refer to Data Appendix for the list of all variables. f For private sector, n=3917; public 
sector, n=1568. 
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Figure 2: Gender Pay Gap in Private sector
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Figure 3: Private sector with occupations and industries
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Figure 4: Gender Pay Gap in Public sector
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Quantile
Lo
g 
ge
nd
er
w
ag
e 
ga
p
OLS QR decomposition loconf1 hiconf1 rawgap
Figure 5: Public sector, w ith occupations and industries
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Quantile
Lo
g 
ge
nd
er
 w
ag
 g
ap
OLS QR decomposition loconf1 hiconf1 raw gap
 16
 Consider the private sector estimates. Figure 2 gives the results of observed gender 
wage gaps with demographic and education control variables; Figure 3 indicates the results 
after adding occupation and industry dummie.13 The striking result is the sharp acceleration 
of the gap as we move towards the upper tail of the conditional wage distribution. This 
finding suggests that there is a glass ceiling in the private sector. High income females are 
more likely to be disadvantaged, due to the unobserved heterogeneity that the model does 
not control for. Summarising this gap using the OLS estimator could be misleading as a lot 
of information is hidden by solely focusing on examination of the mean. 
Next, consider public sector estimates. Figure 4 and Figure 5 gives the estimates of 
the gender wage gaps with and without occupation and industry dummies based on similar 
reasons to those outlined previously. From Figure 4, the wider gaps are found from around 
the 75th to the top percentiles. However, note that the change of the estimated differences is 
only around 10 percentage point. This finding relates to the conclusion that high and low 
income females are equally disadvantaged in the public sector, and the gap is distributed 
rather constantly across the entire wage percentile. 
Furthermore, the obtained result with and without occupation and industry controls 
are remarkably similar in both private and public sector. This can be seen by comparing 
Figure 2 to Figure 3 and Figure 4 to Figure 5. This suggests that our model is robust to the 
potential endogeneity from occupation and industry, and also segregation of women into 
certain occupations and industries is not the major drive of the gender wage gap.  
A prominent difference is found by comparing the results from Table 4 and Table 2. 
Table 2 shows the gender gaps controlling for differences in labour market characteristics 
but assumes that men and women receive similar rewards for these characteristics. The 
result is that a substantial amount of the public sector sticky floor and private sector glass 
ceiling effect is an outcome of the differences in gender characteristics. However Table 4 
indicates otherwise. From Table 4, even after we control for demographic and education 
variables, the gender gap rises throughout the distribution. This indicates that it is not 
gender demographic and education differences that account for the gap at the top of the 
                                                 
13 The results with and without occupation and industry dummies are presented separately due to the potential 
endogeneity of the variables. It is possible that one might choose their jobs and industries base on the 
earning prospects. Controls included for the decomposition are age, age squared, postgrad, diploma, 
bachelor, cert, yr11_less, miss_edu, kids0_4, kids5_14, bornoz, married, defacto, divorced, contract, casual 
and parttime. Refer to Appendix for the list of all occupations and industries. 
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distribution. Rather, it is a result of the differential rewards, in other words the glass ceiling 
is due to the differences in returns between genders. 
 
5. Conclusion 
By utilising QR framework and counterfactual decomposition method, the current 
study has analysed the movements of gender pay gaps along the wage distribution. In 
addressing the prime hypothesis that is posted initially, the major finding reveals the 
existence of glass ceiling in the Australia private sector; whereas the gender wage gap 
seems to be relatively constant over all percentiles in the public sector. 
In this paper estimation took the following steps. First the results from the 
unconditional raw gender gap identified the existence of the gender pay gap in both 
sectors. The second step was obtaining the conditional QR estimates. By imposing the 
restriction of equal returns to labour market characteristics between genders, it was found 
that gender differences accounted for substantial amount of the public sector sticky floor 
and private sector glass ceiling.  
Estimates stratified by genders as well as sectors were also undertaken. The 
results indicated that the pooled QR results are misleading. Accordingly, a counterfactual 
decomposition analysis was undertaken to determine if the gender wage gap is a result of 
gender characteristic differences, or the differences in returns to those characteristics. 
The finding is that in the public sector, the gender gap exists but is distributed more 
evenly. Whereas in the private sector, even after the control of various occupations and 
industries, the gender gap continued to accelerate at the upper tail of the conditional wage 
distribution, hence there is a glass ceiling. Clearly, the observed gender pay gap in both 
sectors is a result of the differences in returns to gender characteristics. 
A glass ceiling effect was identified in the Australian private but not public sector. 
One possible explanation is the adoption of different pay schemes between two sectors. 
In the public sector, the wage is classified by various Australian Public Service (APS) 
classifications, which implicitly implies that public servants earnings are capped at 
certain upper limits. Competition in the private sector is more rigorous and there is no 
standardised pay scheme available across companies or firms. As a result of this, 
potential earnings could be extremely diverse.  
Since the observed wage gap is attributed to the differences in returns to gender 
characteristics, this result relates to the explanation regarding the environment faced by 
women in the labour force. This is in accordance with the finding of Albrecht et al (2003) 
 18
in Sweden labour market. Their conjecture is that Swedish parental leave policy and the 
day care system provides strong incentives for females to participate but not commit 
strongly to a career. According to the OECD employer survey (2001), family-friendly 
arrangements are more commonly provided in the Australian public sector. The absence 
of the glass ceiling effect in the public sector could possibly be credited to the more 
complete family-friendly arrangements, which allows females to participate as well as to 
commit to their career. Consequently a greater flexibility in parental leaves and a higher 
accessibility to childcare system could provide the scope to potentially improve the 
working conditions faced by private sector females. If the working conditions are 
improved, the situation which females are more commonly found in less demanding jobs 
and thus fall substantially behind men towards the top might be altered. 
The differences in returns to gender characteristics could be a form of 
discrimination, or it could be some unobserved heterogeneity that the model does not 
capture. If discrimination is the main factor that is driving the pay gap after extensive 
controls, then female workers are still more likely to be disadvantaged, subject to the 
unobservable family commitments or conventional social norms, even under the 
existence of equal opportunity legislation in Australia.  
In conclusion, previous literature decomposing the mean wage gap, analysis by 
QR framework is largely descriptive, as also in this analysis. However, QR has the 
advantage over mean regression of revealing more insights about where the widest gaps 
are. Even so, in terms of policy implications, this technique does not point out any 
potential causes. It simply provides more information on the extent and distribution of 
differing returns between genders. This highlights important gender issues that need 
further investigation, and future studies can be considered to investigate the possible 
causes of glass ceilings. Reasonable speculation might relate to both labour market 
demand and supply side factors. A possible cause on the demand side could be that wage 
setting procedures for high fliers might favour men either overtly or covertly. This might 
arise if, for example, firms are willing to pay more to get one of their own type,14 while 
on the supply side, high-flying women might be prepared to accept relatively lower 
salaries than men. This maybe due to a reluctance to bargain aggressively, hence 
gratitude at getting a job in a male-dominated world of high-fliers; or simply because of 
the lack of information about what male counterparts are being paid. This situation might 
                                                 
14 The situation where employers may prefer to incur higher costs rather than contract with members of certain 
groups are known as a form of economic discrimination (Becker, 1971).  
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be more likely to occur at the top of the wage distribution, where there are relatively 
fewer women. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of all Control Variables 
1. Basic and educational variables: age, age2, kids0_4, kids5_14, bornoz, 
married, defacto, divorced, contract, casual and part time. Educational variables are 
postgrad, bachelor, diploma, cert, yr11_less and miss_edu. Base of all education 
variables is year_12. 
 
2. Geographic variables:  NSW, VIC, QLD, SA, WA, TAS and NT. The base is 
ACT. Also included are regional variables urban, in_region and out_region, with the 
base of ‘remote’. 
 
3. Employer variables:  size20_99, size100_499, size500, size20_up, tenure of 
employment, ten_emp2 and union.  
 
4. Occupation dummies: manager, professional, associate professional, tradesperson, 
advanced clerk, intermediate clerk, inter production and elementary clerk. Labourer is 
used as the based. 
 
5. Industry dummies: Dummies are mining, manufacturing, energy, construction, 
retail and service, transport, finance and government. Base of all variables is cultural. 
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  Variable Names and Definitions 
age Age of the respondent at the wave 1 interview date.
age2 Age squared.
sex =0 for females; =1 for males.
kids0_4 =1 if respondent has own/non-resident children aged 0-4 years old; =0 otherwise.
kids5_14 =1 if respondent has own/non-resident children aged 5-14 years old; =0 
bornoz =1 if country of birth of respondent is Australia; =0 else where. 
married =1 if respondents’ current marital status is married; =0 otherwise. 
defacto =1 if respondents’  current marital status is defacto; =0 otherwise. 
divorce =1 if respondents’  current marital status is divorced; =0 otherwise. 
contract =1 if respondent is employed on a fixed term contract; =0 otherwise. 
casual =1 if respondent is employed on a casual basis; =0 otherwise. 
part time =1 if respondent is employed on a part time basis; =0 otherwise. 
postgrad =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is postgraduate; =0 otherwise.
bachelor =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is bachelor; =0 otherwise. 
diploma =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is diploma; =0 otherwise. 
cert =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is certificate; =0 otherwise. 
year11_less =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is Year 11 or less; =0 otherwise.
miss_edu =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is undetermined; =0 otherwise.
year12 =1 if respondent’s highest level of education is Year 12; =0 otherwise. 
NSW =1 if respondent’s residential state is New South Wales; =0 otherwise. 
VIC =1 if respondent’s residential state is Victoria; =0 otherwise. 
QLD =1 if respondent’s residential state is Queensland; =0 otherwise. 
SA  =1 if respondent’s residential state is South Australia; =0 otherwise. 
WA =1 if respondent’s residential state is Western Australia; =0 otherwise. 
TAS =1 if respondent’s residential state is Tasmania; =0 otherwise. 
NT =1 if respondent’s residential state is Northern Territory; =0 otherwise. 
ACT =1 if respondent’s residential state is Australian Capital Territory; =0 otherwise.
urban =1 if respondent reside in major cities of Australia; =0 otherwise. 
in_region =1 if respondent reside in inner regional of Australia; =0 otherwise. 
outregion =1 if respondent reside in outer regional of Australia; =0 otherwise. 
remote =1 if respondent reside in remote Australia; =0 otherwise. 
size1_19 =1 if number of employees at work is between 1-19; =0 otherwise. 
size20_99 =1 if number of employees at work is between 20-99; =0 otherwise. 
size100_499 =1 if number of employees at work is between 100-499; =0 otherwise. 
size500 =1 if number of employees at work is 500 or more; =0 otherwise. 
size20_up =1 if number of employees at work is not sure but 20 or more; =0 otherwise.
tenure Tenure with current employer (in years).
ten_emp2 Tenure squared.
union =1 if respondent belongs to trade union or employee association; =0 otherwise.
manager =1 if respondent occupation is manager; =0 otherwise.
professional =1 if respondent occupation is professional; =0 otherwise. 
associate professional =1 if respondent occupation is associate professional; =0 otherwise. 
tradesperson =1 if respondent occupation is tradesperson; =0 otherwise. 
advanced clerk =1 if respondent occupation is advanced clerk; =0 otherwise. 
interproduction =1 if respondent occupation is interproduction; =0 otherwise. 
elementary clerk =1 if respondent occupation is elementary clerk; =0 otherwise. 
labourer =1 if respondent occupation is labourer; =0 otherwise.
mining =1 if respondent works in a mining industry; =0 otherwise. 
manufacturing =1 if respondent works in a manufacturing industry; =0 otherwise. 
energy =1 if respondent works in a energy industry; =0 otherwise. 
construction =1 if respondent works in a construction industry; =0 otherwise. 
retail and service =1 if respondent works in a retail and service industry; =0 otherwise. 
transport =1 if respondent works in a trasport industry; =0 otherwise. 
finance =1 if respondent works in a finance industry; =0 otherwise. 
government =1 if respondent works in a government industry; =0 otherwise. 
cultural =1 if respondent works in a cultural industry; =0 otherwise. 
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Table 5: Interquantile Test 
 10th-25th 25th-50th 50th-75th 75th-90th 10th-50th 50th-90th 
sex 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.087*** 0.133*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
age -0.013** -0.009** 0.002 0.011* -0.022*** 0.013*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
age2 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
postgrad 0.067 0.057 -0.037 -0.037 0.124 -0.073 
 (0.075) (0.048) (0.039) (0.046) (0.082) (0.058) 
bachelor 0.083*** 0.045** -0.019 -0.002 0.128*** -0.021 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) 
diploma 0.047** 0.043** -0.009 -0.013 0.090** -0.022 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
cert 0.005 -0.005 -0.031* -0.043* 0.000 -0.074*** 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.018) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) 
yr11_less -0.022 -0.001 -0.060*** -0.034 -0.023 -0.093*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.020) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) 
miss_edu 0.010 -0.019 -0.031 0.050 -0.009 0.019 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.039) (0.067) (0.068) (0.075) 
kids0_4 0.008 -0.011 -0.008 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026) 
kids5_14 0.039 0.039** 0.006 -0.010 0.078* -0.005 
 (0.032) (0.024) (0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) 
bornoz -0.001 -0.016 -0.026 -0.038* -0.017 -0.064*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
married -0.051** 0.013 0.003 0.010 -0.037 0.013 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) (0.033) (0.029) 
defacto -0.053** 0.014 -0.014 0.051 -0.040 0.037 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) 
divorced -0.071* 0.019 -0.015 0.023 -0.052 0.008 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034) (0.045) (0.039) 
contract 0.038** 0.012 0.048** -0.003 0.050* 0.045 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
casual 0.102*** 0.053*** 0.034** -0.003 0.154*** 0.031 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) (0.027) 
parttime 0.023 0.013 0.037* 0.063** 0.035 0.100*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.026) 
_cons 0.360*** 0.352 0.163** 0.017 0.712*** 0.180* 
 (0.106) (0.073) (0.077) (0.109) (0.126) (0.129) 
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) survey. 
Note: a Reported figures are the estimated coefficients following by its standard errors. b Statistics were 
computed using 1,000 bootstrap samples to obtain appropriate standard errors. c * statistically 
significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level. d Note that sex variable is 
statistically significant across all adjacent quantiles. e n=5867. 
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APPENDIX B: Sample Selection Adjustment 
Analysis neglecting sample selection bias could potentially underestimate the real 
effect of differences in returns. In this paper, it is assumed that a female worker makes 
among the following three decisions: to participate in the private sector; to participate in the 
public sector or not to participate in the labour force. A multinomial logit selection model is 
estimated to capture this selection decision. The reason is that it allows different returns to 
individual characteristics such as education and experience across sectors. Furthermore, a 
female worker is not only making the decision of whether or not she is participating in the 
labour force, but also of which sector to participate in. This raises the possibility of 
significant selection bias in the coefficients of the wage equations. 
To test the sample selection problem, firstly an OLS wage equation, which includes 
the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the first-stage multinomial selection equation is 
constructed. The finding concludes that the lambda coefficients are statistically 
insignificant in both public and private sectors. This result can be seen as a preliminary 
indicator that the model does not suffer severe selection bias problem.15
The selectivity correction for the women’s wage equation has been carried out in a 
similar fashion as in Garcia et al (2001) and Dolado et al (2004). The conventional 
Heckman Lambda approach is used in conjunction with some simplifying and restrictive 
assumptions.16 The steps are summarized as follows: Firstly the inverse Mill’s ratio is 
estimated from a multinomial selection equation.17 Secondly a wage decomposition model 
is estimated by adding inverse Mill’s ratio to the list of regressors in the model. 
The multinomial selection equation includes the additional instruments as follows: 
the first child in the family; born in a majority Muslim country; professional mum; self-
declared as in good health conditions; regional variables or currently renting.18 It is found 
that having children decreases the probability of labour force participation significantly in 
both sectors; whereas being the first born in the family makes a woman more likely to work. 
Females, whose mum is professional, have a higher likelihood of working. Interestingly, 
females born in a majority Muslim country are less likely to join the labour force. 
                                                 
15 Results see Table 6. 
16 A less restrictive and more precise estimation methodology is proposed by Buchinsky (1996). He 
generalised the estimation methodology of Newey et al (1990) and showed that consistent parameter 
estimates can be obtained by including a power series approximation in the context of quantile regression. 
Following Buchinsky, Albrecht et al (2004) constructed a single index selection model adjusted for QR 
wage decomposition.  
17 The inverse Mill’s ratio with three power series expansion terms are used as suggested in Buchinsky(1998).   
18 For details see Table 7. 
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Figure 5 and 6 present the results of the QR wage decomposition incorporating the 
extra inverse Mill’s ratios in the public and private sectors respectively. Consistent with our 
OLS Heckman model, it is found that the additional lambda terms in both sectors are 
statistically insignificant across most quantiles. The curve with sample selection correction and 
without sample selection correction is remarkably similar in both public and private sector. 
The evidences so far suggest that selectivity bias is not severe in this model.19
                                                 
19 Buchinsky (1998) tested for equality of the inverse Mill’s ratio from the single index selection model and a 
standard probit model. A visual comparison showed they were of the same order of magnitude and had 
same signs. Additional sensitivity test showed that 23 out of 45 cases are significant different from each 
other.  
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Table 6: Multinomial Selection Model 
Private Public
age   0.157*** age  0.321***
    (0.014)   (0.023)
age2   -0.003*** age2  -0.004***
    (0.000)   (0.000)
postgrad   -1.010*** postgrad 1.897***
 (0.324)   (0.257)
bachelor   -0.505*** bachelor 1.091***
 (0.123)   (0.165)
diploma   -0.289** diploma 1.178***
 (0.122)   (0.165)
cert   -0.236** cert 0.126
 (0.103) (0.164)
yr11_less   -0.584*** yr11_less   -0.781***
 (0.098) (0.171)
miss_edu -0.391** miss_edu 0.456**
 (0.172) (0.222)
kids0_4   -1.276*** kids0_4   -1.267***
 (0.085) (0.117)
kids5_14   -0.658*** kids5_14   -0.666***
 (0.110) (0.142)
married   -0.305*** married -0.166
 (0.079) (0.101)
ghealth   0.513*** ghealth    0.791***
 (0.081) (0.119)
move1 0.039 move1 -0.153
 (0.085) (0.112)
move5 0.044 move5 -0.128
 (0.078) (0.099)
mumprof 0.024 mumprof 0.084
 (0.074) (0.094)
firstkid   0.153** firstkid 0.065
 (0.065) (0.085)
loneperson 0.095 loneperson 0.300**
 (0.118) (0.143)
urban   0.747*** urban -0.284
 (0.268) (0.278)
in_region 0.495* in_region -0.165
 (0.271) (0.282)
out_region     0.418 out_region 0.076
 (0.281) (0.295)
rent   -0.307*** rent   -0.335***
 (0.078) (0.109)
muslim -0.465** muslim   -1.212***
 (0.211) (0.386)
_cons   -2.424*** _cons   -6.923***
 (0.377) (0.550)
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) survey. 
Note: a Reported figures are the estimated coefficients following by its standard errors. b * statistically 
significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level. d n=7335. e The control group 
is “not to participate in the labour force”. 
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Table 7: OLS Wage Equation with Selectivity Correction 
Private Public 
age 0.051*** age 0.047*** 
 (0.005)  (0.008) 
age2 -0.001*** age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
postgrad 0.373*** postgrad 0.289*** 
 (0.058)  (0.049) 
bachelor 0.284*** bachelor 0.194*** 
 (0.026)  (0.040) 
diploma 0.171*** diploma 0.152*** 
 (0.027)  (0.040) 
cert -0.016 cert -0.067* 
 (0.021)  (0.040) 
yr11_less -0.131*** yr11_less -0.160*** 
 (0.023)  (0.045) 
miss_edu -0.074 miss_edu 0.051 
 (0.046)  (0.062) 
kids0_4 0.054*** kids0_4 0.017 
 (0.019)  (0.029) 
kids5_14 0.016 kids5_14 -0.034 
 (0.027)  (0.034) 
married 0.079*** married 0.059** 
 (0.016)  (0.021) 
_cons 1.689*** _cons 1.830*** 
 (0.076)  (0.145) 
Lambda 0.003 Lambda 0.007 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Source: The data are from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
survey. 
Note: a Reported figures are the estimated coefficients following by its standard errors. b * 
statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.1 level. c For private sector, 
n=3917; public sector, n=1568. 
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Figure 5: Private sector
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Figure 6: Public sector
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